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50.1% Gross Margin, $11 Million in Tariff Refunds and the Business Callaway Deleted to Get There

Callaway posted 50.1% gross margin and $75.2M in Q2 profit. The margin came from tariff refunds, price increases and the low-margin business it cut.

Callaway: Clubs Image: MyGolfSpy

What Happened

Callaway posted Q2 sales of $612.2 million, up two percent, and profit of $75.2 million against $20.3 million last year. GAAP gross margin rose 620 basis points to 50.1 percent, helped by roughly $11 million in tariff refunds, price increases and cutting low-margin business. Golf ball share reached 22 percent. Acushnet outsold and out-earned Callaway but missed EPS and its stock fell.

Callaway's Q2 press release led with basis points instead of dollars, which is its own kind of tell. Gross margin up 620 points on a GAAP basis, to 50.1 percent from 43.9 percent a year ago. Revenue, the number most companies put first, came in at $612.2 million and grew two percent. A company that leads with margin is telling investors what story it wants told.

The story it wants told is profitability, and on that count the quarter delivered. Q2 net profit hit $75.2 million against $20.3 million last year, with $168.3 million banked through six months. Callaway retired $421 million in debt during the quarter, $163 million in bank loans and $258 million in convertible notes, the latter mattering more because converted notes dilute existing shareholders. It has repurchased $84 million of its own stock this year with $120 million of authorization left. Fewer shares outstanding, higher EPS, which came in at 40 cents for the quarter, up 67 percent. Wall Street rewarded it, briefly. The stock touched $19.85 on Aug. 4 and was back to $17.59 by Aug. 7 on cautious Q3 guidance. It was $11.72 on Jan. 1 and roughly $8 a year before that.

Two things in the margin number deserve scrutiny. The first is the roughly $11 million in tariff refunds that landed in the quarter, with up to $50 million expected by year end. Acushnet collected about $38 million of the same, which is why its profit grew 65 percent to nearly $125 million and why its adjusted EBITDA jumped 46 percent. Neither of those is a demand signal. It is a customs accounting event that both companies were smart enough to disclose and both earnings narratives are quietly resting on.

The second is the phrase Callaway used to explain the rest of the gain: cost reduction programs, select price increases, and rationalizing lower-margin business. Rationalizing lower-margin business means killing SKUs, walking away from accounts, and declining volume that does not pay. Anyone who sells Callaway product for a living already knows what that looks like in practice, because Chip Brewer ran this playbook when he arrived in 2012 and inherited a bloated, unprofitable lineup. It worked then. It is working now. It also means the assortment gets narrower, closeout availability gets thinner, and the price points that used to fill the middle of a rack get quietly abandoned. Two percent revenue growth on six points of margin expansion is not a growth company. It is a company improving the quality of what it sells rather than the amount.

The ball business is the exception, and it is the most interesting line in the report. Q2 ball sales of $113.8 million, up 15 percent, with market share at 22 percent as of June 30 against 21 percent to close 2025, including a 250-basis-point move in June alone. Acushnet sold nearly $274 million in balls in the same quarter and more than half a billion year to date. Callaway is not closing that gap, but ball share is the hardest share in golf to move, because it is a repeat-purchase category anchored by tour usage rather than a fitting appointment. A point of it is worth more than a point of driver share, and Callaway got it without the kind of promotional pricing that would have shown up in the margin line.

The contrast with Acushnet frames the whole quarter. Acushnet outsold Callaway, out-earned Callaway, and its stock fell from a $108.31 open to a $93.85 close on an eight-cent EPS miss and a careful outlook. Callaway's fourth-place standing on our global brand index has been flat month over month, which is roughly what a margin-and-buyback story looks like from the outside: holding position, not taking it.

The question for the back half of 2026 is what happens when the easy margin is gone. Price increases have a ceiling, the tariff refunds run out, the low-margin business can only be cut once, and the share count can only shrink so far before someone asks about units again. Callaway now has a 50-percent gross margin and a clean balance sheet, which is exactly the position from which a pure-play golf company is supposed to go take share. Whether it does is the thing worth watching, and the ball number is where it will show up first.

DORMIED INDEX View Brand →
Global Rank#4
DI Score54.9
M/M Change+0.0%
3M Trend+22.5%
12M Trend-18.2%

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Callaway's gross margin increase 620 basis points?

Callaway credits cost reduction programs, select price increases, and rationalizing lower-margin business, meaning cut SKUs and abandoned accounts. Roughly $11 million in tariff refunds also landed in the quarter, with up to $50 million expected by year end.

How does Callaway's golf ball business compare to Acushnet's?

Callaway sold $113.8 million in balls in Q2, up 15 percent, with market share at 22 percent as of June 30. Acushnet sold nearly $274 million in the same quarter and more than half a billion year to date.

Why did Acushnet stock fall after a stronger quarter than Callaway's?

Acushnet outsold and out-earned Callaway but missed EPS expectations by eight cents and offered a cautious outlook. Its stock opened at $108.31 and closed at $93.85 on the day the numbers landed.

What did Callaway do with the Topgolf proceeds?

It retired $421 million in debt during Q2, $163 million in bank loans and $258 million in convertible notes, and has repurchased $84 million of its own stock this year with $120 million of authorization remaining.

What does this mean for retailers carrying Callaway?

Rationalizing lower-margin business translates to a narrower assortment, thinner closeout availability, and fewer mid-tier price points. Callaway ran the same SKU-cutting playbook when Chip Brewer arrived in 2012.

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